The cogito and the foundations of knowledge by Curley, Edwin
NOTICE CONCERNING 
COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS 
 
The material copied here may be protected by copyright 
law in the United States and/or in other jurisdictions. This 
copy was made in compliance with U.S. copyright law and 
is provided to you for the purposes of private study, 
scholarship, or research. 
 
If you use the copy for a different purpose, such as posting 
on a course website, the copyright analysis that supported 
making the copy does not apply. It is your responsibility to 
address copyright for any other uses. For assistance, you 
may wish to consult the library’s guides to Copyright 
Basics and Copyright and Course Websites. You can also 
contact the University of Michigan Library Copyright Office 
at copyright@umich.edu. 
3The Cogito and the 
Foundations of Knowledge
Edwin Curley
Descartes was clearly, in some sense, a foundationalist. He thought that among our beliefs, some are based on other beliefs we have, whereas others are not. The ones not based on others we can call basic beliefs. 
The ones based on others we can call derivative beliefs. Our basic beliefs provide 
the foundations for our system of beliefs; our derivative beliefs are the superstruc-
ture. This metaphor of our system of beliefs as a building, which has foundations 
and a superstructure, and might collapse if the foundations were not solid, is 
prominent both in Descartes’ Discourse on Method and in his Meditations. It is 
there, for example, in the opening lines of the Meditations:
Some years ago now I noticed how many falsehoods I had accepted as true in my 
earliest years, and how doubtful the things were which I had subsequently built on 
them. I realized that it was necessary, once in my life, to overturn all my beliefs, from 
the bottom up, and start again, from the first foundations, if I ever wanted to establish 
anything firm and lasting in the sciences. (AT vii, 17)
There is a more elaborate version of the foundationalist metaphor in the Discourse 
(AT vi, 13–14).
When I say here that one belief is based on another, and ultimately on one or 
more basic beliefs, I mean that the basic beliefs are the beliefs we might ultimately 
offer as reasons for our derivative beliefs if we were asked to give as full a justifica-
tion for them as we could. If we take one belief as a reason for another, then we 
think that the second belief can be inferred from the first by some legitimate means 
of inference. And we also think that we are somehow entitled to hold the first 
belief.
As so far described, foundationalism may seem innocuous. It may even seem 
inevitable, obviously true. But the account so far raises important questions 
which it does not answer. What are the ‘legitimate means of inference’ we use to 
justify our beliefs? How can we justify the claim that they are legitimate? And 
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what entitles us to hold the belief we use as a reason for the belief we are trying 
to justify?
These questions are troubling because it looks as if there might be infinite 
regresses in the offing. Suppose we justify belief p by appealing to another belief, 
q. Our belief in q cannot, it seems, provide much justification for p unless our 
belief in q is itself justified. So what justifies us in believing q? That we have inferred 
it by legitimate means from some other belief, r, which we are also entitled to 
believe? Perhaps, but this will, of course, prompt the same question about r. On 
the plausible assumption that we cannot break off the threatened regress by going 
back to p and using it to justify r (or s, or t, or whatever belief it is we are trying 
to justify in this apparently circular way), and that we cannot go on indefinitely 
justifying one belief in terms of another which itself requires justification, it looks 
as though the only way we can have justified beliefs is to find some beliefs we are 
entitled to hold without our inferring them from other beliefs we are entitled to 
hold, some beliefs which are, as some would now say, properly basic.
There is, of course, a similar problem about justifying the principles of inference 
we use in this argument. Suppose r is an inferential principle we use to move from 
our justified belief in p to a justified belief in q. If r is not itself properly basic, 
then we must try to justify it by appealing to an argument, which will have at least 
one premise and at least one inferential principle. And the same questions will arise 
about the premise(s) and inferential principle(s) of that argument. So a crucial 
problem for foundationalism is that of explaining how our premises and inferential 
principles can be properly basic.
On a popular interpretation of Descartes, his answer to this question was that 
beliefs are properly basic when they are either self-evident or incorrigible reports of 
the contents of our consciousness, and not otherwise. If this is correct, then Descartes 
will say that all of our justified derivative beliefs can be traced back, via finite, 
legitimate inferential paths, to justified basic beliefs of one or the other of these 
two kinds. Outside of mathematics, the basic beliefs which provide our foundation 
will normally include both kinds of properly basic belief. Within mathematics, the 
only basic beliefs required are those which are self-evident.
I think that common interpretation of Descartes is wrong – or at least, wrong 
about the mature Descartes, the Descartes of works like the Discourse and the 
Meditations, works he liked well enough to publish. It is not, in my view, wrong 
about Descartes’ earliest substantial attempt to formulate a theory of knowledge, 
the Rules for the Direction of the Mind (for short, the Regulae). But I think 
Descartes came to see that the version of foundationalism he advocated in the 
Regulae was not a position he wanted to defend. That is why he left it unfinished 
and never published it. And I think he came up with a more interesting version 
of foundationalism in the works he did publish.
In Rules I–III of the Regulae Descartes lays out a program for reducing all the 
separate sciences to one science, modeled on mathematics, which would start with 
assumptions known by intuition, and derive the rest of knowledge from those 
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initial assumptions by deduction. Descartes conceives intuition as a faculty of 
intellectual perception – the conception of a clear and attentive mind – which 
enables us to know the simplest truths with absolute certainty. He conceives 
deduction as a process in which we infer something ‘as following necessarily from 
some other propositions which are known with certainty’ (AT x, 369). As Descartes 
conceives it, deduction itself depends on intuition, since it is ultimately intuition 
which provides us, not only with our properly basic beliefs, but also with the 
principles of inference we use in getting to the derivative beliefs. The legitimacy 
of those inferences is not a matter of their formal validity. Descartes has little use 
for formal logic. He thinks syllogistic reasoning, for example, is doomed to sterility 
because it is inevitably question-begging (AT x, 406).
In the Regulae, Descartes holds that we should reject all merely probable 
knowledge, and take as our starting-points truths we know perfectly, truths which 
cannot legitimately be doubted. We know these indubitable truths by intuition. 
Among the truths so known he cites (AT x, 368–9) such propositions as:
1 I exist
2 I think
3 A triangle is bounded by just three lines
4 2 plus 2 equals 4
5 3 plus 1 equals 4
and
6 that it follows from (4) and (5) that 2 plus 2 equals 3 plus 1.
Notice that this last example is not as simple as the first five, but concerns the 
logical relationship between two propositions and a third proposition. It can 
be regarded as a substitution instance of the general proposition “Things equal 
to the same thing are equal to each other.” But, as we will see later, there is a 
reason why Descartes gives us the substitution instance, not the more general 
proposition.
Descartes’ mature work, I claim, is not content to simply regard such proposi-
tions as the self-evident products of an infallible faculty of intellectual perception. 
It seeks to justify those basic beliefs – though not, of course, by deducing them 
from other justified beliefs. Why did the mature Descartes reject the version of 
foundationalism he had originally embraced?
In Curley (1978), I conjectured (under the influence of Richard Popkin: see 
Popkin 1964) that sometime in the late 1620s Descartes came to feel the impact 
of Montaigne’s skepticism, which did, in the Apology for Raymond Sebond, extend 
even to basic principles of logic, mathematics, and metaphysics. I would not 
suggest that Descartes first discovered Montaigne in the late 1620s. Montaigne’s 
work was so widely read that it is hard to imagine that Descartes did not have 
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some familiarity with it before then. But I do think that by the winter of 1628–9, 
when he retreated to The Netherlands to begin writing the treatise on metaphysics 
which was to become the Meditations, he had come to take Montaigne seriously 
and had abandoned the Regulae, realizing that the theory of knowledge faced 
deeper problems than those he had up to that point identified in scholastic 
philosophy.
Montaigne had questioned even basic principles of logic, using the liar paradox, 
for example, to cast doubt on principles as evident as if p, then p:
Let us take the sentence that logic itself offers us as the clearest. If you say “It is  
fine weather,” and if you are speaking the truth, then it is fine weather. Isn’t that a  
sure way of speaking? Still it will deceive us. To show this, let us continue the  
example. If you say “I lie,” and if you are speaking the truth, then you lie. (Montaigne 
1965: 392)
He also used the incomprehensibility of God’s power to cast doubt on such simple 
propositions of arithmetic as 2 ¥ 10 = 20:
In the disputes we have at present in our religion, if you press your adversaries too 
hard, they will tell you quite shamelessly that it is not in God’s power to make his 
body be in paradise and on earth, and in several places at the same time. And that 
ancient scoffer [Pliny the Elder], how he takes advantage of it! At least, he says, it is 
no slight consolation to man to see that God cannot do everything: for he cannot 
kill himself even if he wished, which is the greatest privilege we have in our condition; 
he cannot make mortals immortal, or the dead live again, nor can he arrange that 
the man who has lived shall not have lived, or that the man who has had honors shall 
not have had them; he has no other power over the past than that of oblivion. And 
to bind this association of man to God further by comical examples, he cannot make 
two times ten not be twenty. That is what he says, and what a Christian should avoid 
having pass out of his mouth. (Montaigne 1965: 393)
It is irreverent for a Christian to say anything of the form “God cannot do X,” no 
matter what X is, and no matter how incomprehensible it may be to us that God 
should do that. Montaigne applies this pious dictum, not only to simple mathemati-
cal truths, but also to metaphysical principles like the fixity of the past: it is no less 
irreverent to say that God cannot arrange that a man who has lived shall not have 
lived than to say that he cannot make two times ten not be twenty.
That Descartes had come, by early 1630, to have considerable sympathy with 
Montaigne’s view will be evident from his correspondence with Mersenne in April 
and May of that year (AT i, 144–53). I suggest that he came to think he could 
not simply claim that our knowledge is based (in substantial part at least) on our 
possession of an infallible faculty of knowledge, which enables us to identify 
propositions so evident in themselves that they require no argument. If each claim-
ant to knowledge were permitted to pick his own ultimate principles, on no better 
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grounds than that the propositions in question were just obvious (i.e., obvious to 
him), the theory of knowledge would be an anarchic mess. If there are no stan-
dards for a properly basic belief other than strength of conviction, then any belief 
whatever might be claimed to be properly basic, no matter how controversial. But 
declaring your favorite controversial principle to be properly basic is much too 
quick a way of dealing with non-believers. And Descartes wants to deal with non-
believers (AT vii, 1–2).
The term “self-evident,” of course, appears frequently in English translations 
of Descartes’ mature works (for example, at AT vii, 69, 111, 112, 115, 138, 140; 
AT viiiA, 6, 8, 19, 70). But that seems to me an unhappy tradition among the 
translators. The Latin in these cases is always per se notum or some variant thereof 
(per se manifestum, per se patet). If the work was written in French, the French is 
normally évident (for example, at AT vi, 7). But these phrases do not, for Descartes, 
have the connotations that the English term “self-evident” has had since the days 
of Locke; that is, producing “universal and ready assent on hearing and under-
standing the terms” (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I, ii, 18). Descartes 
will apply the phrase per se notum and its equivalents to propositions which he 
knows full well do not generate universal and ready assent as soon as the terms 
are understood, such as the proposition that God exists (AT vii, 69, 163–4, 167), 
or the basic laws of motion (AT viiiA, 70). Things which some people can see 
clearly without argument, others cannot see until they are freed of prejudice.
Nevertheless, if Descartes left every proposition liable to a demand for extrinsic 
justification, he faced the threat of an infinite regress, as Montaigne had not failed 
to point out (Montaigne 1965: 454). What to do? As I read Descartes, he came 
up with an ingenious strategy for shifting the burden of proof. He would concede 
to the skeptic that any proposition whatever was in principle subject to reasonable 
doubt, even those which a more conventional foundationalist might have claimed 
to be self-evident. But he would insist that the skeptic provide a reasonable ground 
for doubting it. To qualify as reasonable, a prospective ground of doubt would 
not have to satisfy any stringent evidential requirements. In particular, it would 
not have to be known to be true, or probable on the evidence. It would not even 
have to be something the inquirer believed to be true. The only evidentiary require-
ment a ground of doubt would have to satisfy is that it not be known to be false. 
If a proposition survives attempts to cast reasonable doubt on it, when the evi-
dential requirements for a reasonable ground of doubt are set that low, then the 
skeptic cannot dismiss its acceptance as arbitrary and dogmatic.
We see this dialectic at work in Meditation I. Early in the Meditation, Descartes 
proclaims his intention to reject any of his past beliefs which he can find some 
reason for doubting. It need not be what we would ordinarily consider to be a 
strong reason. So he rejects sense-based beliefs, even when they are about ordinary-
sized objects in his immediate vicinity, because he recalls having been deceived in 
the past by dream experiences which were as distinct as his most vivid waking 
experiences. He makes no claim to know that his recollection of these deceptive 
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dreams is accurate; it is sufficient that this is how he remembers them. That recol-
lection provides him with some reason for doubting his previous sense-based beliefs 
because it opens up some possibility that they may be mistaken.
Then he rejects beliefs not based on the evidence of the senses, even when they 
are about simple mathematical matters, because he believes he has been created 
by an omnipotent being, who might have made him in such a way that he would 
be deceived even about things like the sum of two plus three. This doubt is based 
partly on beliefs he holds (that he has been created by an omnipotent being) and 
partly on beliefs he does not hold, but does not know to be false (that the omnipo-
tent being who created him might be deceiving him). He of course believes God 
to be supremely good; but when he reflects on how often he makes mistakes, he 
recognizes that he does not know that God is not a deceiver. If he was created by 
an omnipotent, supremely good being, it must be consistent with that being’s 
goodness to permit him to be deceived. And that is sufficient, it seems, to generate 
a reasonable doubt about all his former beliefs.
Descartes stresses three points about the doubt toward the end of Meditation 
I (AT vii, 21–2):
1 that none of his former beliefs is indubitable (i.e., not such that no doubt can 
properly be raised about it);
2 that his doubt concerning the things which have formerly seemed most evident 
to him is not frivolous, but based on powerful and well-thought out reasons 
(validas & meditatas rationes, raisons très fortes et mûrement considérées); and
3 that the beliefs he doubts are nevertheless (in some cases at least) highly prob-
able; in spite of the “powerful” grounds he has to doubt them, it is much 
more reasonable to believe them than to deny them.
Eventually Descartes will reformulate the hypothesis of a deceptive creator as 
the supposition that he was created by an omnipotent being who is evil, not good, 
a malicious demon. He does not believe that such a being exists, or think it likely. 
It is enough that he does not know that such a being does not exist. This is sufficient 
to justify the doubt even about those things which formerly seemed to him most 
evident.
Since the evidential requirements for reasonable doubt are set so low, the ques-
tion naturally arises whether they are not so low that Descartes will never be able 
to escape from universal doubt. Is he doomed to the position that he can assert 
nothing, since anything he might be tempted to assert is subject to reasonable 
doubt? That is the danger which threatens him at the end of Meditation I. He 
escapes that danger, or so it seems, in Meditation II, when he decides that, in spite 
of what he had said in Meditation I, his own existence is an exception to the 
generalization about his former beliefs: it is not subject to reasonable doubt.
The reason he escapes, on my reading of the Meditations, is that the very weak 
evidential requirements for reasonable doubt are not the only requirements 
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reasonable doubts must satisfy. There is also an explanatory requirement. A 
reasonable ground of doubt must explain, at least conjecturally, how error is pos-
sible. The grounds of doubt considered in Meditation I all met this requirement. 
The dream doubt explained how sense experience might deceive us by reminding 
us of deceptive experiences most of us have had which cannot be distinguished 
with any certainty from the experiences we take to be non-deceptive. The deceiv-
ing God hypothesis explained how we might be mistaken in all our other beliefs 
because we do not know the origin of our belief-forming mechanisms, and have 
no reason to assume them to be reliable. This is true even of the atheistic hy-
pothesis Descartes flirts with briefly after he first introduces the hypothesis of a 
deceiving God. If the cause of my beliefs is an infinite series of impersonal causes, 
which had no prevision of the effects they were producing, how could I expect 
my cognitive faculties not to be very imperfect?
A skeptical hypothesis which offers even a conjectural explanation of the possi-
bility of error must presume that there is thinking going on, which it alleges to 
be subject to error. So it must entail that I think. This explanatory requirement 
is what is doing the work in the cogito argument of Meditation II. Suppose
there is I-know-not-what deceiver, supremely powerful, and supremely cunning, who 
deliberately and constantly deceives me. Then I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiv-
ing me. And let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that 
I am nothing, so long as I think that I am something. (AT vii, 25)
The hypothesis that a demon is deceiving me about my own existence is self-
defeating, and therefore not a valid ground of doubt, because it entails the very 
proposition which, in this case, it is intended to cast doubt on.
This way of thinking about the cogito sheds light, I claim, on the perennial 
puzzle about the nature of Descartes’ argument in Meditation II. In the Discourse 
on Method (AT vi, 32) Descartes had used the inferential formula which will be 
forever associated with his name: “I think; therefore, I exist.” This way of putting 
his argument makes it look as though Descartes is deducing his existence from his 
thought. And on standard foundationalist assumptions, it raises the question: how 
do you know that you think? Indeed, the author of the Second Objections 
(Mersenne?) raised precisely that question about the argument of the Meditations, 
reinforcing it with the reminder that Descartes claims he cannot be certain of 
anything until he has a clear and certain knowledge of the existence of God, a 
result he cannot claim to have achieved by the beginning of Meditation II (AT 
vii, 124–5).
But in Meditation II, notoriously, Descartes does not use the formula he had 
used in the Discourse. He does not say “I think; therefore, I exist.” In the 
Meditations the “cogito” passage concludes by saying: “So, having weighed all 
these matters very carefully, I must in the end maintain that this proposition, I 
am, I exist, must be true whenever I mention it or conceive it in my mind.” 
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This has suggested to many readers that in the Meditations Descartes is claiming 
intuitive certainty for his own existence, as he had in the Regulae. So people ask: 
is Descartes’ knowledge of his existence intuitive or inferential? It seems to be 
inferential in the Discourse on Method. It is clearly intuitive in the Regulae. 
And it seems to be intuitive again in the Meditations. And, of course, there are 
various other passages which can be used to support one or other of these 
alternatives.
I claim that the solution to this puzzle is that the cogito is, in a sense, both 
inference and intuition, though I hasten to add that Descartes tends to avoid talk 
of intuition in the works he wrote after the Regulae. I think the reason for this is 
that he does not want to appear to be resting anything substantive on his posses-
sion of a supposedly infallible cognitive faculty. So I prefer to say that the proposi-
tion “I exist” is both a first principle, insofar as it is a proposition which Descartes 
takes himself to be justified in accepting without its being the conclusion of 
an argument whose premise Descartes need claim to know, and the conclusion 
of an inference, whose premise is part of whatever hypothesis might be proposed 
as grounds for doubting it. I emphasize the word “hypothesis” here to make it 
clear that the “I think” is not a premise which Descartes is responsible for 
justifying.
When Descartes is writing in a popular vein, as he is in the Discourse, he is content 
to write “I think; therefore, I exist,” though this is apt to prompt the skeptical 
query: “And how do you know that you think?” When he is writing more systemati-
cally, as he is in the Meditations, he is careful to keep the hypothetical status of his 
thinking clear: “If a demon is deceiving me, then I am thinking, and must exist. 
The same conclusion follows from any other skeptical hypothesis I might consider 
in an effort to cast reasonable doubt on my existence. Therefore, I am entitled to 
affirm, with certainty, but without further argument, that I exist.”
I add that Descartes might offer exactly the same rationale for taking the propo-
sition “I think” as a first principle. That too is entailed by any skeptical hypothesis 
we might entertain in an attempt to doubt it, if that hypothesis meets the explana-
tory requirement mentioned above. So Descartes could present the cogito as a 
demonstration of his existence from his thought. But there would be no advantage 
in doing so. If this way of justifying first principles is acceptable – that is, if you 
may take a proposition as a first principle whenever it is entailed by any reasonable 
ground you might consider in an attempt to doubt it (where the evidentiary 
requirements for a reasonable ground of doubt are set very low) – then the exis-
tence of the self is acceptable as a first principle, without needing to be presented 
as the conclusion of an inference from the proposition, “I think,” which is neither 
more, nor less, justified than the proposition “I exist.”
At some point even those who are sympathetic with this line of interpretation 
may object: “All right, I understand how Descartes might think he was 
entitled to assume the truth of the proposition ‘I think’ as a premise in the 
inference to his existence. But what about the conditional proposition ‘If I think, 
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then I exist.’ Isn’t that a further assumption which is necessary for the validity of 
the inference of existence from thought, and which he must justify before he 
can make the inference? We needn’t think of this as a suppressed premise; we can 
think of it as a principle licensing his inference, a principle allowing the legitimacy 
of that inference. But even if we think of it as an inference license, it’s still a 
principle which foundationalism will require Descartes to justify. And he couldn’t 
justify it in the way he justified his assumption that he thinks, could he? The 
conditional proposition connecting thought and existence does not seem to be 
entailed by any skeptical hypothesis which might be offered to cast doubt on his 
existence.”
In the end, I think Descartes would agree that this is a reasonable objection 
and would have a procedure for dealing with it. But his acceptance of this require-
ment is obscured by his resistance to the idea that inferences must be formally 
valid if they are valid at all. He resists representing the cogito as a syllogism, having 
the form:
Whatever thinks exists.
I think.
Therefore, I exist.
He explicitly rejects that representation of the argument in the Second Replies (AT 
vii, 140), when he replies to the objection from Mersenne described above. There 
is a fallacy of relevance here, since Mersenne had not claimed that the cogito was 
a syllogism with a suppressed major premise. His question had concerned the 
minor premise. But it is interesting that Descartes sidesteps the question Mersenne 
actually asked to answer a question he did not ask.
One thing at work in this odd exchange is Descartes’ antipathy to formal logic. 
He thinks that there are valid inferences whose validity is not a matter of form, 
and that those scholastic philosophers who insisted on making them formally valid 
were being unduly fussy. The inference “I think; therefore, I exist” is one of those 
inferences which are valid without being formally valid. So nothing but obscurity 
is gained by treating it as a syllogism. But part of Descartes’ resistance to putting 
the cogito into syllogistic form comes from his sense that the universal premise the 
inference would have in that form does not make a substantive claim about the 
world. (This will perhaps be more clearly true, if we represent the argument not 
as a syllogism, but as an instance of modus ponens, with the suppressed conditional 
premise If I think, then I must exist.) It is rather a purely conceptual claim about 
the relation between thought and existence. So it is an assumption of an entirely 
different kind from the premise “I think.”
In the end, though, Descartes acknowledges that his argument does, in some 
sense, assume a general connection between thought and existence. He admits 
this when he presents his philosophy in synthetic form in the Principles of 
Philosophy:
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When I said that the proposition I think, therefore I exist is the first and most certain 
of all those which occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way, I did not 
thereby deny that one must first know what thought is, what existence is, and what 
certainty is, and that it cannot happen that what thinks does not exist. But because 
these are very simple notions, and ones which on their own provide us with no 
knowledge of anything which exists, I did not think they needed to be listed. 
(Principles I, art. 10, AT viiiA, 8)
When Burman questioned him about the apparent inconsistency between this 
passage and his rejection of the syllogistic representation of the cogito in the Second 
Replies, he reaffirmed the doctrine of the Principles, adding that the meditator 
who infers his existence from his thinking presupposes the general principle impli-
citly, but does not need to be explicitly aware of it. In fact, he discovers that general 
connection between thought and existence when he finds himself unavoidably 
making the inference from his thinking to his existence. Knowledge of particular 
cases must precede knowledge of general truths (AT v, 147).
I do not think this acknowledgment of the need for a general assumption about 
the relation between thought and existence represents a shift of doctrine between 
the Meditations and the Principles. Descartes indicates this in a remarkable passage 
in Meditation III. He had begun this Meditation by making what he evidently 
regarded as a false start. He enumerated a number of truths which he believed he 
could claim to be certain of: that he was a thinking thing; that he had thoughts 
of various kinds; that he affirmed some things, denied others, understood a few 
things, and was ignorant of many others; that he imagined some things; and even 
that he had sensations, provided he understood the word “sensation” as designat-
ing only a certain mode of thought, without implying the existence of any bodies 
whose alterations might be causally responsible for the sensations. He then asked 
himself what conclusion he might draw from these initial certainties. And since he 
thought that what made him certain of these truths was simply the fact that he 
perceived them clearly and distinctly, he was tempted to conclude that anything 
he perceived so clearly and distinctly must be true.
“Tempted to conclude,” but not, in the Meditations, really ready to conclude. 
In the Discourse on Method, he had drawn this conclusion at this stage of his argu-
ment (AT vi, 33) and never looked back. But in the Meditations he permits himself 
a series of reflections which requires him to dig a little deeper. He recalls that there 
have been many things which he thought he perceived clearly and distinctly, but 
which he had nevertheless come to doubt. These included even the simplest truths 
of arithmetic and geometry, though they also included metaphysical principles, 
such as the principle of the fixity of the past. When he thinks concretely about 
these propositions, thinks about particular examples of mathematical or even 
metaphysical truth, he finds that he cannot doubt them:
Whenever I turn my attention to the things themselves which I think I perceive with 
utmost clarity, I am so completely persuaded by them that I spontaneously break out 
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in these words: let whoever can deceive me, he will still never bring it about that I 
am nothing, so long as I think that I am something; or that it should at some time 
be true that I have never existed, even though it is true now that I exist; or that two 
plus three should m ake more or less than five; or any other things in which I rec-
ognize a manifest contradiction. (AT vii, 36)
But when he thinks about these “evident” propositions in general terms, simply 
under the rubric “things I perceive as clearly as possible,” and thinks at the same 
time about the supreme power of God, he cannot help but confess that it would 
be easy for God to cause him to err even about these things.
So even after the apparent establishment of a number of certainties in Meditation 
II, he is in a quandary. He concludes the overture to Meditation III with the 
reflection that, until he has examined whether God exists and can be a deceiver, 
and resolved these issues, he cannot ever be certain of anything. This is the stun-
ning conclusion of the fourth paragraph of Meditation III:
To remove that [metaphysical reason for doubting], I ought, as soon as the oppor-
tunity presents itself, to examine whether there is a God, and if there is, whether he 
can be a deceiver. For so long as I do not know the answer to these questions, I do 
not seem to be able, ever, to be certain of any other thing. (AT vii, 36)
Notice that Descartes does not say: until I know whether God exists and can be 
a deceiver I cannot be certain of anything except the existence of the self and its 
thoughts. He says he cannot be certain of anything. When I first read this passage 
as a graduate student, I was astonished by it. Surely, I thought, he is not taking 
back the results of Meditation II. He is not telling us that he cannot be certain 
of anything at all, including his own existence. But by the time I published Curley 
(1978), I had decided, partly as a result of reading the work of Alan Gewirth (see 
Gewirth 1941), that Descartes means precisely what he says.
One persuasive consideration Gewirth adduced was the fact that when Descartes 
was enumerating those propositions he found he could not help but believe when 
he attended to them, but could doubt when he considered them under the general 
heading of “things I perceive with the utmost clarity,” he included a principle 
equivalent to the inferential principle of the cogito: “let whoever can deceive me, he 
will still never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I think that I am some-
thing.” That is, if I think I am something, I must be something. I take it that 
Descartes is recognizing here that, without a proof of the existence and veracity of 
God, he cannot be certain even of the existence of the self, because he cannot be 
certain of the validity of the inferential principle he used to derive his existence from 
the hypotheses a skeptic might propose in order to cast doubt on his existence.
This is not a happy conclusion. Many critics of Descartes have argued that in 
the first two Meditations he dug himself into a hole he could not climb out of. 
He might have good grounds for regarding his own existence as certain, they 
conceded. But if he requires a proof of the existence and veracity of God before 
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he can be certain of anything else, he cannot get past his own existence, cannot 
justify any ontological claim more meaty than solipsism. For how is he to construct 
his proof of the existence and veracity of God? Only, it seems, by making such 
metaphysical assumptions as: there must be at least as much reality in the cause as 
there is in the effect; or the cause of my ideas must possess at least as much formal 
reality as the ideas possess objective reality.
Those are assumptions which it seems Descartes in fact makes in his arguments 
in Meditation III. Let us set aside the question whether they are plausible. Suppose 
they are. Nevertheless, Descartes’ argument for the existence of God will be a 
proof only if the assumptions it makes are ones he can be certain of. And by his 
own admission, he cannot be certain of those assumptions unless he has a satisfac-
tory proof of the existence of God. And this will be a problem no matter what 
the details of the argument he makes are. Any argument for God’s existence must 
make some assumptions. And even if he comes up with an argument which is more 
attractive than the arguments of Meditation III are, the same question will arise: 
how can he claim certainty about the assumptions of that argument consistently 
with the position he takes at the end of the fourth paragraph of Meditation III?
Consistently with his own requirements, he can never provide the proof of 
God’s existence and veracity which he needs in order to be certain of his clear and 
distinct ideas. This is the famous problem of the Cartesian circle. But on my 
reading of Descartes (and Gewirth), it looks like an even more serious problem 
than it is usually thought to be. For if what we have claimed is correct, he will 
not even be entitled to claim certainty about his own existence. To draw the con-
clusion he wants to from the skeptical hypotheses, and justify his taking his own 
existence as a first principle, he must assume that there is a necessary connection 
between thought and existence, a connection he will not be entitled to assume in 
the absence of a proof of God’s existence.
I think this is a bullet we must bite. I think Descartes does have a plausible 
solution to the problem of the circle. The key, I think, lies in a certain feature of 
clear and distinct ideas which I have already alluded to: whenever we attend to a 
particular clear and distinct idea, we cannot help but assent to it. Descartes men-
tioned this in that passage from Meditation III which I quoted earlier, and he 
comes back to it again in Meditation IV, where he writes that “When I was exam-
ining recently the question whether something exists in the world, I noticed that, 
from the very fact that I considered that, it followed evidently that I existed, I really 
could not help but judge that what I understood so clearly was true” (AT vii, 58, 
emphasis added). Notice that Descartes does not claim here that what he under-
stood clearly, and could not help but judge true, was the proposition that he exists. 
Rather, it is the logical connection between his thinking, his considering the issue 
of his existence, and his existence. It is that inferential principle, and others like 
it, which he needs his proof of God’s existence and veracity to justify.
But how does it help that our clear and distinct ideas are assent-compelling, 
that when we attend to them, we cannot help but judge them to be true? Let 
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me introduce here the idea of an assent-compelling argument. By an assent- 
compelling argument, I mean one whose premises are assent-compelling, and 
whose inferential moves are assent-compelling. Suppose we have an assent- 
compelling argument from a premise, p, to a conclusion, r, via an intermediate 
conclusion, q; p must be assent-compelling in its own right, and q will become 
assent-compelling when we recognize that p is assent-compelling, and that 
the connection between p and q is also assent-compelling; similarly, r will become 
assent-compelling once we have recognized that q is assent-compelling, and that 
the connection between q and r is assent-compelling. I claim that what Descartes 
is trying to do in the Meditations is to construct an assent-compelling argument 
to the conclusion that God exists and cannot be a deceiver.
What good will that do? Cannot the skeptic just point out that the assent- 
compelling character of the premises and inferential moves does not justify us in 
being certain of the conclusion? After all, he might say, could not an omnipotent 
being cause us to be compelled to assent to false propositions? Do these 
assumptions possess anything more than psychological certainty? And have we not 
long ago rejected psychological certainty as a sufficient reason for accepting a 
proposition?
Now I think Descartes’ response to this would be to say that once he has an 
assent-compelling argument to the conclusion that all our clear and distinct ideas 
(i.e., all our assent-compelling ideas) are true, it is no longer enough to claim, 
without supporting argument, that a demon might be deceiving us when we 
assent to these ideas. He is shifting the burden of proof again. In Meditation I, 
the unsupported claim that an omnipotent being might deceive us, even 
about those matters which seemed most evident to us, constituted a reasonable 
ground of doubt because we had no compelling argument to set against it. We 
may have had particular clear and distinct ideas, which we could not doubt 
when we focused our attention on them. But we did not find the general proposi-
tion that all our clear and distinct ideas are true assent-compelling. So we were 
vulnerable to skeptical suggestions that they may not be true, that a sufficiently 
powerful being might deceive us even about such matters as the simplest truths 
of mathematics.
By the end of Meditation IV we are supposed to have an assent-compelling 
argument against that skeptical hypothesis. So it no longer constitutes a reasonable 
ground of doubt. The validity of a ground of doubt is situational, in the sense 
that what constitutes a valid ground of doubt at one stage of the argument, when 
we have no assent-compelling argument against it, will no longer be valid when 
we do have such an argument. Descartes makes this clear in his reply to the Seventh 
Objections. Father Bourdin, the author of those objections, had fastened on 
Descartes’ somewhat surprising rejection, midway through the third paragraph of 
Meditation II, of the existence of minds. That rejection is surprising, partly because 
Descartes will affirm the certainty of his own existence (presumably as a thinking 
thing) by the end of that very paragraph, but partly also because minds had not 
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been mentioned in the preceding Meditation. Bourdin, Descartes complains, 
seems to think that once Descartes has doubted something, he can never reverse 
himself.
But this involves a fundamental misunderstanding of the method of doubt, as 
Descartes, with some exasperation, points out:
At the outset, when I was supposing that I had not yet sufficiently perceived the 
nature of the mind, I numbered it among the doubtful things; but later on, noticing 
that a thing which thinks cannot not exist, and using the term “mind” to refer to 
this thinking thing, I said that the mind existed. My critic proceeds as if I had forgot-
ten that previously I had denied this very thing (when I was taking the mind to be 
something unknown to me); he talks as if the things I was denying earlier (because 
I found them doubtful), I must have thought were always to be denied, as if it was 
impossible that such beliefs could be rendered certain and evident to me. It should 
be noted that throughout he treats doubt and certainty not as relations of our 
thought to objects, but as properties of the objects which inhere in them permanently. 
This means that if we have once realized that something is doubtful, it can never be 
rendered certain. (AT vii, 473)
Bourdin’s objections to the Meditations are prolix, and tiresome, and do not show 
a good or sympathetic grasp of Descartes’ philosophy. As a translator, I can sym-
pathize with that translator of Descartes who said that Descartes must have had 
a very strong desire to stand well with the Jesuits, to take Bourdin as seriously as 
he did. It is understandable that they should not have received very much atten-
tion from Descartes’ commentators. (Alan Gewirth was an honorable exception 
to this generalization.)
Unfortunately, when we neglect Bourdin’s objections, we also neglect Descartes’ 
replies. In doing so, I believe, we miss an important clue to understanding the 
procedure of the Meditations. The preceding quotation from the Seventh Replies 
illustrates the point that the validity of a ground of doubt is situational, that it 
varies depending on the epistemic situation. But it does not say much about how 
a ground of doubt which is valid at one stage can become invalid at a later stage. 
The next passage helps to explain that:
There are reasons which are strong enough [satis validae] to compel us to doubt, 
even though these reasons are themselves doubtful, and hence are not to be retained 
later on   .   .   .   The reasons are strong so long as we have no others which produce 
certainty by removing the doubt. Now since I found no such countervailing reasons 
in the First Meditation, despite meditating and searching for them, I therefore said 
that the reasons for doubt which I had found were “powerful and well thought-out” 
[validas & meditatas]. But this is beyond the grasp of our critic, for he goes on to 
say “When you promised me powerful reasons, I expected certain ones, ones of the 
kind demanded by this little pamphlet of yours” – as if the imaginary pamphlet he 
has put together can be related to what I said in the First Meditation. (AT vii, 
473–4)
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Bourdin was not the last person to think that “powerful” grounds of doubt must 
be certain ones. Some critics of the dream argument make the same assumption 
when they ask Descartes: “How do you know you’ve had experiences just as vivid 
as your most vivid waking experiences, which you subsequently decided were 
illusory, because they occurred when you were asleep and dreaming?”
But the crucial point in this passage is the part where Descartes says: “The 
reasons [for doubt] are strong so long as we have no others which produce cer-
tainty by removing the doubt.” My claim is that Descartes will have produced 
these reasons strong enough to remove the skeptical doubts when he produces an 
assent-compelling argument that God exists and is not a deceiver. It is sufficient 
that the premises of the argument and the inferential moves be psychologically 
compelling. It is not necessary for them to be indubitable in the strong sense 
which implies that they cannot properly be doubted.
In Curley (1978) I endeavored to justify this procedure as a kind of circum-
stantial argumentum ad hominem against the kind of Pyrrhonian skepticism you 
find in Montaigne. The Pyrrhonian advocates what he calls the principle of equi-
pollence, according to which for every argument in favor of a proposition an 
equally strong argument against it can be found. As Montaigne puts it: “[The 
Pyrrhonians’] expressions are: ‘I establish nothing; it is no more thus than thus, 
or than neither way   .   .   .   the appearances are equal on all sides; it is equally legiti-
mate to speak for and against’ ” (Montaigne 1965: 373–4). The criterion of the 
strength of an argument here is its degree of psychological persuasiveness. The 
principle of equipollence is what is supposed to justify the characteristic Pyrrhonian 
resolution to suspend judgment about everything, and not, like the academic 
skeptics, to deny that we can have certain knowledge, but concede that some 
propositions may be highly probable.
When someone who holds the principle of equipollence is confronted with an 
assent-compelling argument in favor of the truth of our clear and distinct ideas, 
he can no longer cast doubt on that conclusion by simply postulating the possibil-
ity of deception by an omnipotent being. He must produce an equally strong 
argument, i.e., an assent-compelling argument, in favor of the opposite conclusion. 
In the absence of such an argument, Descartes is entitled to his conclusion.
So far my discussion has focused on two kinds of basic belief: necessary truths, 
like the inferential principle underlying the cogito, and two contingent truths, the 
propositions that I think and that I exist. But Cartesian foundationalism holds 
that there are other contingent truths which are also properly basic. On the 
popular interpretation of Descartes’ foundationalism, which I mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, all my beliefs about my own mental states and activities 
are properly basic because they are incorrigible in the following sense: if I believe 
that I am in a particular mental state, or engaged in a particular mental activity, 
then necessarily I am in that state or engaged in that activity.
This is a view often ascribed to Descartes, along with the companion view that 
our mental states and activities are transparent, in the sense that if I am in a par-
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ticular mental state, or engaged in a particular mental activity, then I know that I 
am in that state or engaged in that activity, by a continuous, direct, non-inferential 
awareness. Let us call the combination of these doctrines of transparency and 
incorrigibility the doctrine of our privileged access to our own mental life.
I do not believe that Descartes consistently held to a fully general doctrine of 
our privileged access to our own mental life. In Curley (1978), I argued that the 
textual evidence is very mixed, but that sometimes Descartes explicitly rejects the 
doctrine of privileged access. A striking example occurs in the Discourse on Method 
when Descartes writes that to discover the opinions that people really hold we 
should attend to their actions rather than to their words, because “few people are 
willing to say everything they believe, and   .   .   .   many people do not know what 
they believe, since believing something and knowing that one believes it are dif-
ferent acts of thinking, and the one often occurs without the other” (AT vi, 23). 
Elsewhere, Descartes makes similar points about the difficulties we face in knowing 
our own passions. In Curley (1978), I argued that in passages like this Descartes 
showed himself to be part of a long tradition, counting among its members such 
philosophers and theologians as Plato, Augustine, Luther, and Calvin, who all 
regarded self-knowledge as a difficult achievement rather than something which 
was inescapable.
Nevertheless, I do think that Descartes held a weak version of the doctrine of 
privileged access. There are some of our mental states or activities which he thinks 
we can know with a certainty that it would not make sense to question. A prime 
example would be our own sensations, when sensation is construed properly, as a 
state which does not presuppose any physical occurrences, but involves only my 
being in a state in which it seems to me, sensorily, that something is the case. This 
is the argument of the second movement of Meditation II (AT vii, 25–9). I see a 
light (or so I think). If I think of this sensation as an awareness of an object external 
to me, mediated by the organs of my body, I may be mistaken about my seeing 
a light. It may be that there is no light there which is causing me to have the sen-
sations I am having. It may be that I have no body. But I cannot be mistaken if 
I limit my claim to reporting the current state of my consciousness, that it seems 
to me that I see a light.
Why can I not be mistaken about this? Or, better, why does it not make sense 
to suppose that I am mistaken about this? My answer would be that if I try to 
cast doubt on my sensations, so understood, I must have a reason for doing so, 
and the skeptical hypotheses I might entertain in order to do that must meet the 
same explanatory requirement we discussed earlier, in connection with my know-
ledge that I think and that I exist. I say I see a light and the skeptic tells me I may 
be mistaken. “Perhaps,” he says, “you only seem to see a light. Perhaps the visual 
experiences you’re having now are a consequence of a blow to the head, or a 
pressure exerted on your eyeballs, or a chemical substance which someone put in 
your drink.” But whatever the skeptic says, in attempting to explain how I might 
be mistaken, will imply that I’m having certain experiences which mislead me. 
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When I insist that “at least it seems to me that I see a light, that much is certain,” 
he cannot go on to say: “Well, no, perhaps it only seems to you that it seems to you 
that you see a light; but that’s consistent with the claim that it doesn’t actually 
seem to you that you see a light.” To attempt to iterate the “it seems to me” 
operator in that way is to talk nonsense, quite literally. It is to say things we simply 
cannot understand. But if the skeptic must concede my propositions about 
how things seem to me, I’m entitled to take those propositions as properly 
basic beliefs.
I do not think it follows from this line of reasoning that I am entitled to claim 
all beliefs about my present mental states as properly basic. In particular, proposi-
tions about what I believe do not seem to be apt for this line of defense. In many 
(if not all) judgments, I think, Descartes will want to say that part of what is going 
on is my being in a state in which something seems to me to be the case. For 
example, when I affirm that there is music playing now in my study, my ground 
for that belief is that it seems to me that I hear music playing. But the belief 
involves more than my just being in that state. As the analysis of judgment in 
Meditation IV implies, there is also an act of will involved, an act by which I assent 
to my sense impression. I could withhold that act of assent, in which case, though 
it would still seem to me that I hear music playing, I would not judge that I hear 
music playing. This extra element which is involved in belief, but not in mere 
sensation, does not seem to be something which would be open to being defended 
by the maneuvers I have used to defend our certainty about our sensations. So I 
think Descartes would have a principled reason for not treating all his beliefs about 
his own mental states as properly basic. This seems to me as it should be.
My account of Cartesian foundationalism, and of the role the cogito argument 
plays in that project, is now essentially complete. But there is one objection which 
someone might make to it which I would like to deal with, briefly. Some readers 
may find this defense of Descartes disappointing. They may say: “This works, if it 
works at all, only against a certain kind of skeptical opponent. You’ve presented 
Descartes’ defense as a kind of argumentum ad hominem against Pyrrhonian skep-
ticism, and attempted to capitalize on the Pyrrhonian’s acceptance of the principle 
of equipollence. But this is an exceptionally radical form of skepticism, which will 
have little appeal to readers who have not been seduced by the charms of Montaigne. 
The argument won’t, and can’t, work against more moderate and credible forms 
of skepticism, which don’t embrace the principle of equipollence.”
No one to whom I have presented my interpretation of Descartes has ever said 
this to me. But it surprises me that they have not, since it seems to me a natural 
objection, much of which I agree with. My reply would be that, although Descartes’ 
argument does seem to me to be designed for use against that particular form of 
skepticism, and limited in its effectiveness to that form of skepticism, this is not 
such a serious limitation. First, I would be quite happy to get from a critic the 
concession that Descartes’ argument is, in fact, effective against that form of 
skepticism. Descartes’ argument is so often dismissed as hopeless that getting such 
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a concession would seem to me no small accomplishment. Second, if Descartes 
does achieve a victory over Pyrrhonian skepticism, we might regard that as the 
first battle in a campaign which would then go on to attack the more moderate 
and credible forms of skepticism which the critic imagines to be more dangerous. 
In that campaign, we might find Montaigne useful, since his defense of Pyrrhonism 
involves a sharp critique of academic skepticism.
But I am not, in fact, prepared to say that Descartes’ defense of knowledge 
achieves a victory even over the Pyrrhonian skeptic. All I have attempted to do is 
to show that Descartes has a defense against the charge of circularity, if he can 
produce an assent-compelling argument that God exists and is not a deceiver. I 
do not think he has produced that kind of argument for those conclusions. So the 
fact that he has a defense against the charge of circularity, while nice, does not 
vindicate his overall defense of knowledge.
